Panzer-Lehr Division
When this division arrived in Normandy, it was probably better equipped than any other German division during the war. Its organization was
It was formed from various training units and was considered to be among the best divisions in the German army. Its equipment most likely surpassed any German division during the war. On 1 June it had, including the attached 99 Panzer IV, 89 Panther, 31 JagdPz IV, 10 StuG III, 8 Tiger (3 tiger I, 5 Tiger II (
316 Funklenk Panzerkompanie). This gave a total of 237 tanks and assault guns.
All four panzer grenadier battalions were carried by sdkfz251 half tracks. Also the engineer battalion was fully equipped with armoured half tracks. Altogether the division possessed 658 operational SPW and 35 in short term repair. Each panzer grenadier battalion had 108 machine guns, six 8 cm mortars and 39 Panzerschreck, nine 3,7 cm guns on halftracks and eight 7,5 cm infantry guns on half tracks.
The artillery regiment had one battalion with twelve 10,5 cm howitzers and one battalion with 15,2 cm howitzers. The I. Abteilung was in Germany equipping with Wespe and Hummel self propelled guns. Fuel shortages hampered it on the march to Normandy and by 20 June it had reached Vire, south of St Lo.
Usually the Flak battalion of a Panzer division was authorized eight or twelve 8,8 cm Flak guns, but Pz.Lehr had eighteen, and 37mm Self propelled AA guns.
The division had a manpower strength of 14 699 on 1 June 1944.7
At the beginning of June the Pz.Lehr division was deployed in the Chartres - Le Mans - Orléans area. In 7th Armee area. Despite the threat of allied invasion the Panther battalion, which actually belonged to 3. Pz.Div., was loaded on trains to be sent to the eastern front. On 5 June the first train had reached Magdeburg while the last was at Paris. This meant that the strongest battalion of the division was missing when the allies invaded France.
On D-Day the division received orders to march to Normandy. The Panther battalion was ordered to move back to France to join the division in Normandy. Often the journey to Normandy by Pz.-Lehr has been described as a costly and prolonged affair due to intervention of allied air power. Often it is said that the Pz.-Lehr lost five tanks, 84 SPW and towing vehicles and 90 wheeled vehicles. But according to Ritgen, who at the time was commander of the repair and maintenance company of the Pz IV battalion, this initial report was exaggerated, infact that the division lost 82 SPW and 10 towing vehicles during the entire month of June.
Of greater importance than the losses were the delays. The Panzer IV battalion (II./Pz.Rgt. 130) had only reached a wooded area north of Alençon on the route to a Falaise on the morning of 7 June and was short of fuel. The II./Pz.Gren.Rgt. 902 went into action on the morning of 8 June. The following day the II./Pz.Rgt. 130, Pz.Gren.Rgt. 901, I./Pz.Gren.Rgt. 902 and Pz.Jäg.-Lehr-Abt. 130 were committed. On 10 June the Panther battalion arrived and it was sent into action the following day.
The
316. Pz.Kp. (Fkl) did not bring its Tiger II tanks to Normandy and I have covered their story in a previous blog post. These vehicles were suffering with technical deficiencies and it was ordered that they should be sent back to Germany. Since the rail net was damaged and the transfer of these vehicles had low priority they remained in Chateaudun area.
The Pz.Lehr division continued fighting British forces until relieved by the 276. Inf.Div. This was accomplished gradually between 26 June and 5 July. June had been a month of intensive fighting for the Pz.Lehr divisions. Casualties during June amounted to 490 killed in action, 1 809 wounded and 673 missing.
On 8 July eleven Pz.Kpf.Wg. IV were sent to Pz.Lehr as replacements.19 Eight Panthers had been sent on 28 June.
The first action against US troops was the attack in the le Désert area on 11 July. This attack was made despite considerable numerical inferiority. Against the odds the Germans managed to thrust several kilometers into the American defences, but when the real force ratio began to dawn upon them they clearly had to withdraw. As such the attack was a failure, which is hardly surprising given the force ratio, what is surprising is that it did gain ground at all.
Pz.Lehr Division lost 22 tanks due to all causes from 1 July to 15 July. That all these should have been destroyed by air power on 11 July only seems very unrealistic, especially since there are several German reports and participants stating that tanks have been knocked out by gun fire, but none has been found saying that a tank was hit by air craft. The "substantiating" methods of the allied air forces must certainly be called into question. Also it seems wholly unlikely that all claims by ground forces should have been wrong and all claims by air forces should have been correct.
Until operation Cobra the division remained in the area west and northwest of St. Lô. On 20 July the Pz.Aufkl.Abt. 130 and the II./Pz.Gren.Rgt. 902 were withdrawn for refitting. These were placed in the Percy area.
On 21 July the division had the following artillery: I./Pz.Art.Rgt. 130 with 1-3. (3 lFH each); II./Pz.Art.Rgt. 130 with 4. (3 x Wespe), 5. (5 x Wespe) and 6. (2 x Hummel); III./Pz.Art.Rgt. 130 with 7. (3 x 15,2 cm H), 8. (2 x sFH) and 9. (4 x 10 cm Kan); 311. Flak-Abt. (1-3. with 6 x 8,8 cm each).
Two days later the division had three battalions rated as "schwach" and two were rated as "abgekämpft". Also five other battalions were subordinated to Pz.Lehr.26
During 24 and 25 July heavy bombers targeted the positions held by Pz.Lehr to pave the way for the ground units attacking within the framework of operation Cobra. The effects of this carpet-bombing have evoked much controversy.
According to the post-war manuscript by Bayerlein the division lost about 950 men 24-25 July, while other units subordinated to the division lost another 1 200 men.27 He also estimated that about 50 % of the soldiers killed and wounded during those two days were the result of the carpet-bombing.28 However most of the losses during these two days were probably mainly recorded as missing. During July the Pz.Lehr division lost 347 men killed in action, 1 144 wounded and 1 480 missing.29 It was explicitly stated that the majority of the missing were incurred due to the carpet-bombings.
Probably most casualties were not men killed or wounded by the bombing, rather they were stunned and taken prisoner when the US ground forces advanced. According to Ritgen, who at the time commanded the Pz.Kpf.Wg. IV battalion30, no Pz IV was hit by the bombardment since they had been withdrawn to constitute a reserve31. Also he asserts that only very few Panthers and tank destroyers were destroyed during the bombardment.32
Again it seems that carpet-bombings did not kill and wound large numbers of soldiers and neither does the available evidence indicate large-scale destruction of equipment. The important effect was the disruption caused and the effect on the morale of the men subjected to such an air attack. In fact the short bombings on 24 and 25 June caused almost 900 casualties on the US side.33 Probably this was not far from the losses inflicted on the Germans.
Already before operation Cobra the Pz.Lehr was seriously depleted. Casualties during June and July totaled 5 943 officers and men. During the same period 3 437 replacements and convalescents arrived at the division.34 Consequently it was short of 2 506 men compared to 1 June 1944. Since the infantry endured the vast majority of the casualties the division was almost deprived of riflemen. This meant that the tanks and the artillery constituted the backbone of the defense. However these two arms suffered from serious shortages of ammunition and fuel. Consequently the Pz.Lehr and its sub-ordinat-ed units, disrupted by the bombardment, could not resist the 140 000 men assembled for operation Cobra.
There was a tank repair workshop at Cerisy-le-Selle, where about 30 tanks had been assembled for repairs. Most of these had to be abandoned on 27 July when US forces closed in. When the American units advanced towards Avranches the Pz.Lehr was subordinated to the SS Pz.Korps.
On 1 August the Pz.Lehr had a strength of 11 018 men and had 33 tanks and assault guns operational and a further 44 in workshops. Artillery was more scarce. The division only had nine howitzers ready for action. One reason for this was that the I./Pz.Art.Rgt. 130 had been involved in ground combat with elements of the US 3rd Armoured division northwest of Marigny on 26 July. The division had 391 combat ready SPW and a further 54 in short-term repair.
The I./Pz.Rgt. 6 still had 89 % of its authorized manpower strength. The II./Pz.Rgt. 130 was less fortunate since it only had 63 % of authorized manpower strength.
Since the division was worn it was decided that it should be refitted. A Kampfgruppe von Hauser was formed from the still combat ready parts of the division on 5 August. This included a mixed artillery battalion and a weak Pz.Kpf.Wg. IV company It was subordinated to the II. Fallsch.Korps.
The remainder of the division, including the rear services was ordered to move to Alençon to rest and refit. These parts were to receive new equipment and replacements. On the 6th the recon battalion was sent south to Mayenne to counterattack the American outbreak and captured bridge over the Mayenne at Aaron.. They were subordinated to 81. Korps on 8 August.
By 9 August the refitting units were located between 9. Pz.Div. and 708. Inf.Div defending the route between Mayenne and Alençon. Stragglers had been returning to the division and some replacements had arrived while workshops had been able to repair some tanks and other equipment.
A Kampfgruppe was formed from the refitting units, consisting of parts of Pz.Gren.Rgt. 902, I./Pz.Rgt. 6, Pz.Art.Rgt. 130 and Pz.Aufkl.Abt. 130. Also the I./Pz.Gren.Rgt. 11 from 9. Pz.Div. was subordinated, as was elements of Sich.Rgt. 1. This force was committed to the sector between Jublains and Conlie, east of Mayenne.
On 12 August KGr von Hauser had disengaged and was moving towards Fontainbleau to rest and refit. The rest of the division soon followed. On the evening the following day Bayerlein, on his own initiative, ordered the rest of the division to follow. Early on the following day the division had already reached east of Argentan.
However a Kampfgruppe Kuhnow was left behind. This consisted of elements from Pz.Gren.Rgt. 902, a tank company and a howitzer battery. During the night between 16 and 17 August this formation crossed the Orne river at Mesnil-Jean and joined the 12. SS-Pz.Div. the following day. It broke out of the pocket already on 20 August and the following day it assembled at Senlis, north of Paris.50
The main part of Pz.Lehr was temporarily sent into action in the Nonant-le-Pin - St. Lombard area. On 17 August it was relieved by 344. Inf.Div. and was finally moved to Fontainebleau.51
On 22 August the division had approximately ten Pz.Kpf.Wg. IV and ten Panther.52 The division received the Schn.Abt. 509, 510 and 511 to use as replacements.53
During August the division suffered 1 468 casualties.54 Together with the casualties during June and July (given above) this gave a total of 7 411 casualties during
To 1.: On 18.8.1943 four 'Grille' Ausf. H were shipped from an ordnance depot to Pz.Gren.Lehr-Rgt. 901, at that time an independent 'Heerestruppe'.On 14.1.1944 this unit became part of the newly formed Pz.Lehr-Division. The heavy infantry gun companies of the divisions two Pz.Gren. regiments were now authorized to have six 'Grille' each and so
8 'Grille' Ausf. M were shipped to the division on 5./8.2.1944 to bring up the total to 12. It appears that the 9.(IG)/Pz.Gren.Lehr-Rgt. 901 then had a mix of four Ausf. H and 2 Ausf. M while the 9.(IG)/Pz.Gren.Lehr-Rgt. 902 had six Ausf. M.
To 2.: When the Pz.Lehr-Div. was formed in January 1944 its Pz.Jg.Lehr-Abt. 130 initially was equipped with 3 - 5 Panzerjäger II für 7,5 cm Pak 40/2 - AKA Marder II - in all three companies. In addition to that the 1. Kp. had a platton of four 8,8cm Pak 43/1 auf Geschützwagen III/IV(Sfl.) - AKA 'Hornisse/Nashorn'.
At the end of February 1944 the 3. Kp. took over 9 StuG III from the Pz.Kp.(Fkl.) 316 which was to be converted to Tiger II tanks. In addition to that the 3. Kp. received 4 Pzkpfw. IV. By mid March 1944 the 'Marder II' and 'Nashorn' of the 1. and 2. Kp. were completely replaced with 31 new Jagdpanzer IV L/48.
On 18.5.1944 orders were received to hand back the 9 StuG III to Pz.Kp.(Fkl.) 316 because its conversion to Tiger II tanks had been cancelled due to serious technical problems. The Pzkpfw. IV also disappeared again (orders were to hand them over to the 21. Pz.Div.) and all three companies of Pz.Jg.Lehr-Abt. 130 now were organized into two platoons equipped with Jagdpz. IV L/48 plus one platoon with 7,5 cm Pak 40 mot.Z.
To 3.: From the divisional monthly status reports it appears the fully armored 5.(s)/Pz.Aufkl.Lehr-Abt. 130 had a Kan.Zug, le.I.G.Zug, s.Pak-Zug and Pi-Zug. So in theory it should have had:
6x 251/1
2x 251/3
7x 251/7
6x 251/9
1x 251/11
4x 251/17
= 26 m.SPW, 2 le.I.G. 7,5 cm, 3 s.Pak 7,5 cm
On 1.6.1944 the 5./Pz.ALA 130 did report having 26 m.SPW and the weapons I listed available, but the exact type of m.SPW is not further specified.
There were no 234/3 with Pz.ALA in Normandy, only 25 234/2 'Puma' in the 1. Kp.. A few
3. and 4. kompanies of Panzer Lehr Aufklarung abteilung were equipped with sdkfz250 SPW but Jean Claude Perrigault book Pz Lehr division give sdkfz 251 e.g two sdkfz251/2 instead of sdkfz 250/7 and three sdkfz 251/9 instead of sdkfz 250/8. Which one is right ?
