16 Luftwaffen Felddivision Normandy 1944
This year one of my main projects is to complete units for my Normandy Collection. The Luftwaffe field divisions tend not to be built due to there short history and poor fighting capabilities. The two Luftwaffe field divisions 16 and 17 were both roughly handled in Normandy during the fighting and were dissolved and broken up by the end of August 1944. I will be using SHQ Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht figures for the division, along with resin 1/76-1/72 vehicles and guns.
History
The 16th Luftwaffe Field Division was formed on December 1, 1942 at the Groß-Born military training area. This resulted in the creation of the Luftwaffe Jaeger Regiments 31 and 32 of three battalions from lufwaffe ground staff with the average age of 38. The division also created Luftwaffe Artillery Regiment 16 with mixed pieces of anti aircraft and artillery assets. Additional units were added Luftwaffe panzerjager regiment 16, Luftwaffe Pioneer Battalion 16, an luftwaffe Reconnaissance Platoon, an Luftwaffe Intelligence Company and supply troops. The majority of the division was horse drawn.
In March 1943, the division, which had not yet been fully trained, was transferred to the Netherlands as an occupation force and took over coastal security in the Ijmuiden-Haarlem-Leiden-Scheveningen area in the summer of 1943 being a static division its infantry training was poor and had very few automatic weapons, the artillery regiment could only field three batteries at this time.
On November 1, 1943, the division was taken by the Wehrmacht, renaming it Field Division 16 (L). The division completed its restructure, creating Jäger Regiment 46 by taking the third battalions from 31 and 32 and adding a training battalion.
After the start of the Allied invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944, the division commander, Lt. Gen. Sievers received the order on the 20th of June to move the division from Holland to Normandy. The division commenced road movement than rail then foot during the night by columns to the invasion front. 32 trains were used and no casualties were recorded.
At this time, the division had the following units:
In March 1943, the division, which had not yet been fully trained, was transferred to the Netherlands as an occupation force and took over coastal security in the Ijmuiden-Haarlem-Leiden-Scheveningen area in the summer of 1943 being a static division its infantry training was poor and had very few automatic weapons, the artillery regiment could only field three batteries at this time.
On November 1, 1943, the division was taken by the Wehrmacht, renaming it Field Division 16 (L). The division completed its restructure, creating Jäger Regiment 46 by taking the third battalions from 31 and 32 and adding a training battalion.
After the start of the Allied invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944, the division commander, Lt. Gen. Sievers received the order on the 20th of June to move the division from Holland to Normandy. The division commenced road movement than rail then foot during the night by columns to the invasion front. 32 trains were used and no casualties were recorded.
At this time, the division had the following units:
Divisions-Nachschubtruppen 16 (L)
Fahrschwadron zug (L) HQ messenger
Kraftfahr-Kompanie (L) motor pool company
Nachschub-Kompanie 16 (L) supply company
Werkstatt-Kompanie 16 (L) workshop company
Verwaltungsdienste 16 (L)
Verwaltungs-Kompanie 16 (L) administration company
Bäckerei-Kompanie 16 (L) Bakery company
Schlächterei-Kompanie 16 (L) livestock slaughter company
Sanitätsdienste 16(L)
2 x Sanitäts-Kompanie 16 (L) medical company
Kranken-Kraftwagen-Zug 16 (L) ambulance platoon
Veterinär-Kompanie 16 (L) (Veterinary)
Divisions-Nachrichten-Abteilung 16 (L) intelligence
Stab Kompanie1 & 2nd Kompanie
Jäger-Regiment 31 (L)
Regimental Stab1st battalion
Stab
4 companies 500 men
2nd battalion
Stab
4 companies 500 men
MG and Mortar coy
Jäger-Regiment 32 (L)
Regimental Stab
1st battalion
Stab
4 companies 500 men
2nd battalion
Stab
4 companies 500 men
MG and Mortar coy
Jäger-Regiment 46 (L)
Regimental Stab
1st battalion
Stab
4 companies 500 men
2nd battalion
Stab
4 companies 500 men
MG and Mortar coy
16 Panzerjager Abteilung (L)
Stab1. Kompanie (5cm PaK38 and 7.5cm PaK40) RSO tow
2. Kompanie (2 StuG III G) (8 more on the 8th of July)
3. Kompanie (twelve 2cm FlaK38) sdkfz 8
16 Pioneer Abteilung (L)
Stab3 companies 378 men
16 fusilier battalion (L)
Stab3 Jäger company’s
1 machine gun company 406 men
2 companies 238 men
1. Batterie (no guns)
2. Batterie 4 x 7.62 FK288(r)
3. Batterie 4 x 7.62 FK288(r)
4. Batterie 4 x 7.62 FK288(r)
5. Batterie (no guns)
6. Batterie 4 x 7.62 cm
7. Batterie 4 x 12.2 cm
8. Batterie 4 x 12.2 cm
9. Batterie 4 x 12.2 cm
(Munoz, Luftwaffe Field Divisions, p.255:)
On the 5th of July three of the division infantry Regiments 31, 47 and 32 were deployed into the line taking up the 21st Panzer division positions east of the Orne estuary and joining 12th SS in the west. Taking up line positions from Hérouville- Lébisnay - and Hill 64 the railway line and road D60 to the coast being the divisions left flank. The replacement of the 21.PzDiv by the 16.LwFelddivision in the area north of Caen took place on 5.7.44 at 18:00. Parts of the 21.PzDiv remain in the positions, including I./PzRgt 22, PzJgAbt 200, parts of Sturmgeschütz-Abt. 200, II. and III./Art.Rgt 155 sited behind the ridge on the Colombelles road. Heavy tank regiment 503 was also to join the 16 Felddivision (L) line of defence on the night of 7th however due to the preparatory air bombardment did not join the division. (Wolfgang Schneider, Tiger in Combat - The Operations in Normandy, self-published Uelzen, 2004, p.93)
Late in the evening of July 7, between 9:50 and 10:30 p.m., 450 enemy aircraft, according to other sources 467 British aircraft, dropped 2,300 tons of high-explosive bombs on the German defense lines north of Caen and around 11:00 p.m. two British artillery corps opened fire on the German lines. This extremely heavy artillery fire continued without interruption or lessening until the morning of the next day, when the British 3rd and 59th Divisions began the attack on the positions of the 16th felddivision. (Jagolski, Luftwaffe Division, p. 132, Munoz Luftwaffe Field Divisions, p. 257) This concentrated firepower had practically destroyed the 16th felddivision, all of the division's battalion commanders, whose battalions were deployed in the front line, had fallen and the division itself lost 75% of its total combat strength.
Within an hour, the British had achieved their partial objective of taking Lebisey and Heronville and continued their attack towards Point 64 and Caen. The British 3rd Division in the sector of the 16th Air Force Field Division reported at 8:35 a.m. that it had completed its mission to clear the forest east of Lebisey. Le Bujude was also lost and the enemy was advancing on Epron.
At 9:00 a.m., Panzer Group West received a report from LXXXVI.AK that, after heavy air attacks and heavy barrage, the enemy had begun an attack in the area of the 16th felddivision at around 6:00 a.m., had penetrated Lebisey with tanks and was advancing on Calix. The Commander-in-Chief ordered the deployment of the II. Battalion of the 21st Panzer Division to the division. This concentrated firepower had practically destroyed the 16th felddivision, all of the division's battalion commanders, whose battalions were deployed in the front line, had fallen and the division itself lost 75% of its total combat strength.
The British encountered only slight resistance from the 16th Felddivision (L), at around 4:30 p.m., the 3rd British Division had taken Hill 64 from the 16th Felddivision.
Ordered to withdraw east across the Orne at 19:15 on the 8th into the lines of the 21st Panzer Division and placed at Colombelles village, Colombelles Chateau and the Caen steel works south of the town. The division infantry regiments are said to have suffered 75% losses, around 375 men, crossed the river. (Jagolski, Luftwaffe Field Division, p. 132-133, 12th SS, p. 255, 257, 259, 260, 265). Colonel Hans von Luck, combat group commander of PzGrenRgt 125 of the 21.PzDiv, recalled that a battalions of the 16.Felddiv.(L) was placed under his armored combat group, while other battalions of this division were also said to have been under the command of PzGren-Rgt 125. (Munoz, Luftwaffe Field Divisions, p.257: Source Hans von Luck, Panzer commander, The memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck, Praeger Publishers, Westport, 1989, p.169
On July 9, 1944, eight StuG III were delivered to the 16th Felddivision (L).
(Munoz, Luftwaffe Field Divisions, p. 259: Deliveries of the armored vehicles BA-MA RH 10/349)
Panzer Group West attempted to reorganize its forces and improve and strengthen its defensive positions south of Caen. In the rear of the 16th Field Division (L), which the German leadership and its division commander, Major General Sievert, assumed would again be the main target of the British-Canadian attacks due to its losses and previous performance, anti-aircraft and armored units were prepared for counterattacks. (Munoz, Luftwaffe Field Divisions, p.260)
At around 5:30 a.m., the 3rd Company of the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion was alerted. After a short, heavy artillery barrage, enemy forces, British tanks and Canadian infantry, broke through the HKL between Cuterville and Colombelles and took possession of the high ground north of the Colombelles factory complex.
The 32nd (L) Jäger Regiment battalion strength retreated to Cuterville, leaving the enemy open to Giberville and the area east of Caen. (Schneider, Tiger in Combat – Normandy, p. 100, map p. 102)
On July 15, 1944, the last parts of the 16th Field Division (L) arrived at the front, about 2,400 men who were immediately distributed across the thin front lines.
Although the LXXXVI.AK, Panzer Group West, nominally had four divisions in mid-July 1944, the 21st Panzer Division, the 346th and 711th Infantry Division and the 16th Field Division (L), it only had the strength of a reinforced division, since each of these divisions could only be considered a combat group. The only reasonably operational unit was the heavy tank (Tiger) unit 503, which was directly subordinate to the corps. (Munoz, Luftwaffe Field Divisions, p.260, 268: Munoz incorrectly mentions the Schw.SS-PzAbt 103 here, which was not deployed in Normandy at this time because it still had no tanks, see also R.Pfeiffer, Zur Geschichte der s.SS-Pz.Abt 103/503)
On July 15, 1944, the commander of the HGr.B, Field Marshal Rommel, traveled to the Orne area in the afternoon in anticipation of a major enemy attack and visited the 346th Inf Div, the 16th Field Div.(L) and the 21st Panzer Div one after the other. He had the leaders report on the situation and structure of the units. Details of the measures to defend against the major attack were discussed. (Schneider, Tiger in Combat - Normandy, p.105)
In front of the field bridgehead east of the Orne lay under the command of Panzer Group West: LXXXVI.AK with
711.InfDiv
346.InfDiv in the sector Franceville-Pl. to north of Touffreville
16.Felddiv (L) in the sector north of Touffreville, to Colombelles chateau with subordinate Panzergrenadier Regiment 192, 21.PzDiv, on the left to the Orne bridge in Caen.
The focus of the impending enemy attack was to be expected in the sector of the 16th Air Force Field Division, Division Command Post Argences, which had suffered heavy losses in the fighting for Caen. Therefore, not only was the 192nd Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 21st Panzer Division subordinated to it and inserted on the left wing, but the bulk of this division and other units were deployed in the depths of the main battle area.
The front parts of the 16th Air Force Field Division only formed an infantry veil, since
previous experience had shown that a dense garrison
could hardly withstand the barrage of enemy artillery any better. Behind them was the combat group von Luck, according to the commander of the 125th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 21st Panzer Division, Lt. Colonel von Luck, in several farm strong points.
II./125 in the Touffreville - Emiéville area,
I./125 in the Cuverville - Giberville - le Mesnil Frémentel - Démouville area
and StuGeschAbt 200 with 5 Bttr to 6 Pak 7.5 cm long and 4 howitzers 10.5 cm on
"Hotchkiss" chassis.
To support this combat group, I./PzRgt 22 (Pz IV) and the heavy
PzAbt 503 (Tiger) were in the Sannerville - Emiéville area.
Further south, on the ridges of Bourgebus, PzAA 21 and PzPiBtl
220 were deployed to protect the artillery positions of the 16th Felddivision and 21st PzDiv artillery behind them, as well as the Luftwaffe heavy anti-aircraft batteries.
The LXXXVI.Ak was in charge of the 9th nebelwerfer brigade. A total of 194 artillery guns and 272 mortars with 1632 tubes were used. In addition, 78 Flak 8.8 and 12
other heavy anti-aircraft guns. (12.SS, p. 274-275)
On July 17, 1944, the Jg.Rgt. (L) 32 was deployed north of Caen alongside the Pz.Gren.Rgt. 192 of the 21.Pz.Div. At this time, the I./32 was the only
Regiment in the division that was still fully operational.
Behind the 16th Felddivision and the 272nd Infantry Division deployed at the front are the intervention reserves of the 21st Panzer Division and the heavy Panzer Division 503. In the deep zone, the 78 x 8.8 guns of an anti-aircraft division have taken up position (anti-aircraft and anti-tank defense) (LAH, p. 160)
Feldersatz-Bataillon 16 (L)
Stab2 companies 238 men
Artillerie-Regiment 16 (L)
Before the transfer, the 16th Artillery Regiment (L) was rearmed. The large 10.5 cm anti-aircraft guns of the 1st battalion was replaced with Russian 7.62 cm guns. The II. Battalion also handed over its French 15.5 cm guns and was equipped as follows:1. Batterie (no guns)
2. Batterie 4 x 7.62 FK288(r)
3. Batterie 4 x 7.62 FK288(r)
4. Batterie 4 x 7.62 FK288(r)
5. Batterie (no guns)
6. Batterie 4 x 7.62 cm
7. Batterie 4 x 12.2 cm
8. Batterie 4 x 12.2 cm
9. Batterie 4 x 12.2 cm
(Munoz, Luftwaffe Field Divisions, p.255:)
Deployment Normandy
From June 25th, the first parts of the division arrived in the Vimont area southeast of Caen ( Meyer, 12.SS, map p. 237). By July 16th, 1944, the last parts of the division had arrived at the front. According to OB West, Ia, TgbNr. 5197/44 gKdos v, 2,7,1944, the II./JgRgt 46 (L) and the I./ JgRgt 32 (L) were deployed (west of the Orne), while the I./JgRgt 46 (L) and the II./JgRgt 32(L) were prepared for deployment.On the 5th of July three of the division infantry Regiments 31, 47 and 32 were deployed into the line taking up the 21st Panzer division positions east of the Orne estuary and joining 12th SS in the west. Taking up line positions from Hérouville- Lébisnay - and Hill 64 the railway line and road D60 to the coast being the divisions left flank. The replacement of the 21.PzDiv by the 16.LwFelddivision in the area north of Caen took place on 5.7.44 at 18:00. Parts of the 21.PzDiv remain in the positions, including I./PzRgt 22, PzJgAbt 200, parts of Sturmgeschütz-Abt. 200, II. and III./Art.Rgt 155 sited behind the ridge on the Colombelles road. Heavy tank regiment 503 was also to join the 16 Felddivision (L) line of defence on the night of 7th however due to the preparatory air bombardment did not join the division. (Wolfgang Schneider, Tiger in Combat - The Operations in Normandy, self-published Uelzen, 2004, p.93)
Operation Charnwood
Operation Charnwood began on the afternoon of July 7, 1944, with the British battleship "Rodney," which opened fire with its heavy 34.6 cm naval artillery from a distance of 25,000 yards and fired 28 salvos at Hill 64, 1.5 km north of Caen, a hill that dominated the position of the 16th Felddivision and was, in the British view, a key point of defense. The streets of Epron and Lebisey converged there and a wide street led to the city center and to the intact Orne bridge.Late in the evening of July 7, between 9:50 and 10:30 p.m., 450 enemy aircraft, according to other sources 467 British aircraft, dropped 2,300 tons of high-explosive bombs on the German defense lines north of Caen and around 11:00 p.m. two British artillery corps opened fire on the German lines. This extremely heavy artillery fire continued without interruption or lessening until the morning of the next day, when the British 3rd and 59th Divisions began the attack on the positions of the 16th felddivision. (Jagolski, Luftwaffe Division, p. 132, Munoz Luftwaffe Field Divisions, p. 257) This concentrated firepower had practically destroyed the 16th felddivision, all of the division's battalion commanders, whose battalions were deployed in the front line, had fallen and the division itself lost 75% of its total combat strength.
Within an hour, the British had achieved their partial objective of taking Lebisey and Heronville and continued their attack towards Point 64 and Caen. The British 3rd Division in the sector of the 16th Air Force Field Division reported at 8:35 a.m. that it had completed its mission to clear the forest east of Lebisey. Le Bujude was also lost and the enemy was advancing on Epron.
At 9:00 a.m., Panzer Group West received a report from LXXXVI.AK that, after heavy air attacks and heavy barrage, the enemy had begun an attack in the area of the 16th felddivision at around 6:00 a.m., had penetrated Lebisey with tanks and was advancing on Calix. The Commander-in-Chief ordered the deployment of the II. Battalion of the 21st Panzer Division to the division. This concentrated firepower had practically destroyed the 16th felddivision, all of the division's battalion commanders, whose battalions were deployed in the front line, had fallen and the division itself lost 75% of its total combat strength.
The British encountered only slight resistance from the 16th Felddivision (L), at around 4:30 p.m., the 3rd British Division had taken Hill 64 from the 16th Felddivision.
Ordered to withdraw east across the Orne at 19:15 on the 8th into the lines of the 21st Panzer Division and placed at Colombelles village, Colombelles Chateau and the Caen steel works south of the town. The division infantry regiments are said to have suffered 75% losses, around 375 men, crossed the river. (Jagolski, Luftwaffe Field Division, p. 132-133, 12th SS, p. 255, 257, 259, 260, 265). Colonel Hans von Luck, combat group commander of PzGrenRgt 125 of the 21.PzDiv, recalled that a battalions of the 16.Felddiv.(L) was placed under his armored combat group, while other battalions of this division were also said to have been under the command of PzGren-Rgt 125. (Munoz, Luftwaffe Field Divisions, p.257: Source Hans von Luck, Panzer commander, The memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck, Praeger Publishers, Westport, 1989, p.169
On July 9, 1944, eight StuG III were delivered to the 16th Felddivision (L).
(Munoz, Luftwaffe Field Divisions, p. 259: Deliveries of the armored vehicles BA-MA RH 10/349)
Panzer Group West attempted to reorganize its forces and improve and strengthen its defensive positions south of Caen. In the rear of the 16th Field Division (L), which the German leadership and its division commander, Major General Sievert, assumed would again be the main target of the British-Canadian attacks due to its losses and previous performance, anti-aircraft and armored units were prepared for counterattacks. (Munoz, Luftwaffe Field Divisions, p.260)
At around 5:30 a.m., the 3rd Company of the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion was alerted. After a short, heavy artillery barrage, enemy forces, British tanks and Canadian infantry, broke through the HKL between Cuterville and Colombelles and took possession of the high ground north of the Colombelles factory complex.
The 32nd (L) Jäger Regiment battalion strength retreated to Cuterville, leaving the enemy open to Giberville and the area east of Caen. (Schneider, Tiger in Combat – Normandy, p. 100, map p. 102)
On July 15, 1944, the last parts of the 16th Field Division (L) arrived at the front, about 2,400 men who were immediately distributed across the thin front lines.
Although the LXXXVI.AK, Panzer Group West, nominally had four divisions in mid-July 1944, the 21st Panzer Division, the 346th and 711th Infantry Division and the 16th Field Division (L), it only had the strength of a reinforced division, since each of these divisions could only be considered a combat group. The only reasonably operational unit was the heavy tank (Tiger) unit 503, which was directly subordinate to the corps. (Munoz, Luftwaffe Field Divisions, p.260, 268: Munoz incorrectly mentions the Schw.SS-PzAbt 103 here, which was not deployed in Normandy at this time because it still had no tanks, see also R.Pfeiffer, Zur Geschichte der s.SS-Pz.Abt 103/503)
On July 15, 1944, the commander of the HGr.B, Field Marshal Rommel, traveled to the Orne area in the afternoon in anticipation of a major enemy attack and visited the 346th Inf Div, the 16th Field Div.(L) and the 21st Panzer Div one after the other. He had the leaders report on the situation and structure of the units. Details of the measures to defend against the major attack were discussed. (Schneider, Tiger in Combat - Normandy, p.105)
In front of the field bridgehead east of the Orne lay under the command of Panzer Group West: LXXXVI.AK with
711.InfDiv
346.InfDiv in the sector Franceville-Pl. to north of Touffreville
16.Felddiv (L) in the sector north of Touffreville, to Colombelles chateau with subordinate Panzergrenadier Regiment 192, 21.PzDiv, on the left to the Orne bridge in Caen.
The focus of the impending enemy attack was to be expected in the sector of the 16th Air Force Field Division, Division Command Post Argences, which had suffered heavy losses in the fighting for Caen. Therefore, not only was the 192nd Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 21st Panzer Division subordinated to it and inserted on the left wing, but the bulk of this division and other units were deployed in the depths of the main battle area.
The front parts of the 16th Air Force Field Division only formed an infantry veil, since
previous experience had shown that a dense garrison
could hardly withstand the barrage of enemy artillery any better. Behind them was the combat group von Luck, according to the commander of the 125th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 21st Panzer Division, Lt. Colonel von Luck, in several farm strong points.
II./125 in the Touffreville - Emiéville area,
I./125 in the Cuverville - Giberville - le Mesnil Frémentel - Démouville area
and StuGeschAbt 200 with 5 Bttr to 6 Pak 7.5 cm long and 4 howitzers 10.5 cm on
"Hotchkiss" chassis.
To support this combat group, I./PzRgt 22 (Pz IV) and the heavy
PzAbt 503 (Tiger) were in the Sannerville - Emiéville area.
Further south, on the ridges of Bourgebus, PzAA 21 and PzPiBtl
220 were deployed to protect the artillery positions of the 16th Felddivision and 21st PzDiv artillery behind them, as well as the Luftwaffe heavy anti-aircraft batteries.
The LXXXVI.Ak was in charge of the 9th nebelwerfer brigade. A total of 194 artillery guns and 272 mortars with 1632 tubes were used. In addition, 78 Flak 8.8 and 12
other heavy anti-aircraft guns. (12.SS, p. 274-275)
On July 17, 1944, the Jg.Rgt. (L) 32 was deployed north of Caen alongside the Pz.Gren.Rgt. 192 of the 21.Pz.Div. At this time, the I./32 was the only
Regiment in the division that was still fully operational.
Behind the 16th Felddivision and the 272nd Infantry Division deployed at the front are the intervention reserves of the 21st Panzer Division and the heavy Panzer Division 503. In the deep zone, the 78 x 8.8 guns of an anti-aircraft division have taken up position (anti-aircraft and anti-tank defense) (LAH, p. 160)
Operation Goodwood 18.07.1944
The British and Canadians continued the clearing of the Caen city east area with Operation "Goodwood" from the bridgehead east of the Orne at Ranville and from the Canadian positions on the edge of the city. Once again, the position of the 16th Felddivision (L) was in the middle of the target of the Allied bombers and attack aircraft. The enemy air attack, artillery and battleship fire pounded the German positions without interruption for two and a half hours.
Shortly before 5:00 a.m., the heavy infantry artillery opened fire on the identified anti-aircraft positions. During the next 45 minutes, 3,200 tons of bombs rained down on the position divisions, the 16th Air Force Field Division and parts of the 21st Panzer Division.
As the heavy bombers took off, the heavy naval artillery from HMS "Roberts", "Mauritius" and "Enterprise" as well as the artillery from three army corps began to cover the identified or suspected German artillery positions with fire. The pounding lasted until 7:35 a.m., then the infantry attack divisions moved through the heavy dust clouds that had been thrown up.
When the medium bombers of the 9th US Air Force arrive at 7:00 a.m., a large part of the targets cannot be seen through the dust, so that some of them turn back. However, the fighter bombers and fighters attack the entire depth of the main battle area.
At 8:30 a.m., the 8th US Air Force attacks the area southeast of Frénouville and Bourguébus-Hubert Folie-Grentheville with Liberators in several waves until 9:30 a.m.
(LAH, p. 165, see also map no. 1, 28.-30.6.44, map no. 4 18.-21.7.44, see also Schneider, Tiger in Combat - Normandy, map p. 106)
The remaining parts of the 16th Field Division (L) infantry regiments were in the front line in the area south of St. Honoriene and Escoville back into Collombelles in a loose L shaped line of defence. The attacking enemy infantry units and tanks broke through the thinly manned positions of the 16th Felddivision (L) and the strong points just behind it. Strong resistance was only offered by the 21st Panzer Division and various SS units. Anyone who had not been killed or wounded could no longer think of resistance after the terrible bombardment and the effects of the firestorm. The heavy weapons, especially the anti-tank guns, were destroyed. The resistance of a few courageous soldiers was almost ineffective against the vast mass of 200 tanks that rolled over them.
The remnants of the 16th Felddivision were simply overrun and were largely destroyed by the enemy's material superiority, as they had not been able to break away from the fiercely pressing enemy in time.
(see also Jagolski, Air Force FD, p. 133, 12th SS, p. 277 ff.)
All regimental and battalion commanders as well as 36 company commanders were out of action as a result of these two blows. The 16th Field Division (L) had ceased to exist.
The major British attack began at 7:45 a.m., closely supported by direct artillery fire support.
The British advanced from their position east of St. Honorine with the 159th Infantry Brigade of the 11th Armd.Div. The fighters of I./Jg.Rgt 46 (L) only offered isolated resistance.
(Schneider, Tiger in Combat – Normandy, p.115, see also map p.114)
At around 8:30 a.m., Panzer Group West received the first reports of "heavy barrage and bombing on the eastern Orne bridgehead near Colombelles in the 16th Air Force Field Division's sector." The LXXXVI.AK also reported "about 100 enemy tanks from St. Honorine to the south."
On the Orne, I./JgRgt 32 (L) initially held up the 9th Canadian Brigade at the Chateau of Colombelles, and they even withdrew suddenly. An air raid at 13:00 was the explanation, but it had no effect, and the defended chateau was not hit either. Only after the entire artillery of the 3rd Cand. Div. had barraged the chateau, causing fires to break out, did they have to abandon it at 15:15. (Schneider, Tiger in Combat – Normandy, p.125)
Attack against the 21st Panzer Division with remnants of the 16th Field Division (L) Battle for Mondeville, remnants of the 31st and 32nd Jäger Regiments return to the 12th SS Panzer Division, deployment of the 21st Panzer Division in the combat area of the 16th Air Force Field Division
(Author's note: The "Goodwood/Gut Holz" offensive was so unique in terms of its material expenditure that it is still the subject of so-called "Battlefield Tours" by the British "Staff College" every year (1980s), whereby this offensive is analyzed again and again together with German guests because the enormous material impact of that time, 2077 bombers with a carpet of bombs of 8,000 tons and the enormous barrage of artillery fire, had the effect of a tactical nuclear strike and is therefore studied again and again)
"Goodwood" did not bring the enemy the success they had hoped for after these preparations. Combat groups, especially the 200th Assault Gun Division, stopped the force of the attack, in the evening the 1st SS Panzer Division arrived, and later parts of the 12th SS Panzer Division. But after two days of heavy fighting the enemy had lost 469 tanks.
2. LwPiBtl. 16 On 11.07.44, battle day in Colombelles/Caen
8./LwJgRgt 46 on 18 July 1944, action in Demouville
The successor of Hptm. Hrantschnig as battalion leader of the I./LwJgRgt 32 was Oblt. Koschwitz, who was killed on 18 August 1944.
Kampfgruppe Johann: Oberst Dr. Edgar Johann RgtKdr LwJgRgt 31
19.07.1944
During the night of 18-19 July 1944, the 21st Panzer Division received orders to completely relieve and integrate the remnants of the now disbanded 16th Field Division (L), just under two battalions and an anti-tank platoon, and to set up a new HKL. Smaller parts of the 16th Field Division (L) were transferred to its right-hand neighbour, the 346th Infantry Division. However, the 21st Panzer Division received around 1,500 replacement men as a result of these measures.
The only exceptions were a portion of the remaining artillery, which was handed over to the 711th Infantry Division, as well as the communications troops, the supply units and the officers of the 16th Air Force Field Division. These units were initially deployed in the rear area and later formed the core of a newly formed 16th Volks Grenadier Division.
(Schneider, Tiger in Combat - Normandy, p. 127)
19.07.1944
During the night of 18-19 July 1944, the 21st Panzer Division received orders to completely relieve and integrate the remnants of the now disbanded 16th Field Division (L), just under two battalions and an anti-tank platoon, and to set up a new HKL. Smaller parts of the 16th Field Division (L) were transferred to its right-hand neighbour, the 346th Infantry Division. However, the 21st Panzer Division received around 1,500 replacement men as a result of these measures.
The only exceptions were a portion of the remaining artillery, which was handed over to the 711th Infantry Division, as well as the communications troops, the supply units and the officers of the 16th Air Force Field Division. These units were initially deployed in the rear area and later formed the core of a newly formed 16th Volks Grenadier Division.
(, p. 127)
The division was finally destroyed between July 18th and 25th, 1944, according to the OKW between July 23rd and 25th.
It lost approximately 2,500 dead, wounded and prisoners between July 1st and August 3rd, 1944.
After an attack by the 21st Panzer Division in the Bois du Homme, east of St. Martin, which failed with very heavy losses, the KTB of the Panzer Gr. West noted on 1.8.44, 19:20 (or 19:30): "The attack by the 21st Panzer Division could not prevail because the troops assigned by the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division did not meet the requirements..."
The remnants of the division, stragglers of the infantry, were integrated into the 21st Panzer Division and the 346th Infantry Division.
The staff of the 16th Air Force Field Division and the baggage train etc. were combined with the 158th Reserve Division and thus formed the 16th Infantry Division, newly formed as part of the 30th Wave, which became the 16 Volksgrenadier Division in October 1944 and which was later involved in battles with American units in the Moselle Valley in France.
Tiger in Combat - Normandy, W. Schneider
Grenadiers, Kurt Meyer
Shortly before 5:00 a.m., the heavy infantry artillery opened fire on the identified anti-aircraft positions. During the next 45 minutes, 3,200 tons of bombs rained down on the position divisions, the 16th Air Force Field Division and parts of the 21st Panzer Division.
As the heavy bombers took off, the heavy naval artillery from HMS "Roberts", "Mauritius" and "Enterprise" as well as the artillery from three army corps began to cover the identified or suspected German artillery positions with fire. The pounding lasted until 7:35 a.m., then the infantry attack divisions moved through the heavy dust clouds that had been thrown up.
When the medium bombers of the 9th US Air Force arrive at 7:00 a.m., a large part of the targets cannot be seen through the dust, so that some of them turn back. However, the fighter bombers and fighters attack the entire depth of the main battle area.
At 8:30 a.m., the 8th US Air Force attacks the area southeast of Frénouville and Bourguébus-Hubert Folie-Grentheville with Liberators in several waves until 9:30 a.m.
(LAH, p. 165, see also map no. 1, 28.-30.6.44, map no. 4 18.-21.7.44, see also Schneider, Tiger in Combat - Normandy, map p. 106)
The remaining parts of the 16th Field Division (L) infantry regiments were in the front line in the area south of St. Honoriene and Escoville back into Collombelles in a loose L shaped line of defence. The attacking enemy infantry units and tanks broke through the thinly manned positions of the 16th Felddivision (L) and the strong points just behind it. Strong resistance was only offered by the 21st Panzer Division and various SS units. Anyone who had not been killed or wounded could no longer think of resistance after the terrible bombardment and the effects of the firestorm. The heavy weapons, especially the anti-tank guns, were destroyed. The resistance of a few courageous soldiers was almost ineffective against the vast mass of 200 tanks that rolled over them.
The remnants of the 16th Felddivision were simply overrun and were largely destroyed by the enemy's material superiority, as they had not been able to break away from the fiercely pressing enemy in time.
(see also Jagolski, Air Force FD, p. 133, 12th SS, p. 277 ff.)
All regimental and battalion commanders as well as 36 company commanders were out of action as a result of these two blows. The 16th Field Division (L) had ceased to exist.
The major British attack began at 7:45 a.m., closely supported by direct artillery fire support.
The British advanced from their position east of St. Honorine with the 159th Infantry Brigade of the 11th Armd.Div. The fighters of I./Jg.Rgt 46 (L) only offered isolated resistance.
(Schneider, Tiger in Combat – Normandy, p.115, see also map p.114)
At around 8:30 a.m., Panzer Group West received the first reports of "heavy barrage and bombing on the eastern Orne bridgehead near Colombelles in the 16th Air Force Field Division's sector." The LXXXVI.AK also reported "about 100 enemy tanks from St. Honorine to the south."
On the Orne, I./JgRgt 32 (L) initially held up the 9th Canadian Brigade at the Chateau of Colombelles, and they even withdrew suddenly. An air raid at 13:00 was the explanation, but it had no effect, and the defended chateau was not hit either. Only after the entire artillery of the 3rd Cand. Div. had barraged the chateau, causing fires to break out, did they have to abandon it at 15:15. (Schneider, Tiger in Combat – Normandy, p.125)
Attack against the 21st Panzer Division with remnants of the 16th Field Division (L) Battle for Mondeville, remnants of the 31st and 32nd Jäger Regiments return to the 12th SS Panzer Division, deployment of the 21st Panzer Division in the combat area of the 16th Air Force Field Division
(Author's note: The "Goodwood/Gut Holz" offensive was so unique in terms of its material expenditure that it is still the subject of so-called "Battlefield Tours" by the British "Staff College" every year (1980s), whereby this offensive is analyzed again and again together with German guests because the enormous material impact of that time, 2077 bombers with a carpet of bombs of 8,000 tons and the enormous barrage of artillery fire, had the effect of a tactical nuclear strike and is therefore studied again and again)
"Goodwood" did not bring the enemy the success they had hoped for after these preparations. Combat groups, especially the 200th Assault Gun Division, stopped the force of the attack, in the evening the 1st SS Panzer Division arrived, and later parts of the 12th SS Panzer Division. But after two days of heavy fighting the enemy had lost 469 tanks.
2. LwPiBtl. 16 On 11.07.44, battle day in Colombelles/Caen
8./LwJgRgt 46 on 18 July 1944, action in Demouville
The successor of Hptm. Hrantschnig as battalion leader of the I./LwJgRgt 32 was Oblt. Koschwitz, who was killed on 18 August 1944.
Kampfgruppe Johann: Oberst Dr. Edgar Johann RgtKdr LwJgRgt 31
19.07.1944
During the night of 18-19 July 1944, the 21st Panzer Division received orders to completely relieve and integrate the remnants of the now disbanded 16th Field Division (L), just under two battalions and an anti-tank platoon, and to set up a new HKL. Smaller parts of the 16th Field Division (L) were transferred to its right-hand neighbour, the 346th Infantry Division. However, the 21st Panzer Division received around 1,500 replacement men as a result of these measures.
The only exceptions were a portion of the remaining artillery, which was handed over to the 711th Infantry Division, as well as the communications troops, the supply units and the officers of the 16th Air Force Field Division. These units were initially deployed in the rear area and later formed the core of a newly formed 16th Volks Grenadier Division.
(Schneider, Tiger in Combat - Normandy, p. 127)
19.07.1944
During the night of 18-19 July 1944, the 21st Panzer Division received orders to completely relieve and integrate the remnants of the now disbanded 16th Field Division (L), just under two battalions and an anti-tank platoon, and to set up a new HKL. Smaller parts of the 16th Field Division (L) were transferred to its right-hand neighbour, the 346th Infantry Division. However, the 21st Panzer Division received around 1,500 replacement men as a result of these measures.
The only exceptions were a portion of the remaining artillery, which was handed over to the 711th Infantry Division, as well as the communications troops, the supply units and the officers of the 16th Air Force Field Division. These units were initially deployed in the rear area and later formed the core of a newly formed 16th Volks Grenadier Division.
(, p. 127)
The division was finally destroyed between July 18th and 25th, 1944, according to the OKW between July 23rd and 25th.
It lost approximately 2,500 dead, wounded and prisoners between July 1st and August 3rd, 1944.
After an attack by the 21st Panzer Division in the Bois du Homme, east of St. Martin, which failed with very heavy losses, the KTB of the Panzer Gr. West noted on 1.8.44, 19:20 (or 19:30): "The attack by the 21st Panzer Division could not prevail because the troops assigned by the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division did not meet the requirements..."
The remnants of the division, stragglers of the infantry, were integrated into the 21st Panzer Division and the 346th Infantry Division.
The staff of the 16th Air Force Field Division and the baggage train etc. were combined with the 158th Reserve Division and thus formed the 16th Infantry Division, newly formed as part of the 30th Wave, which became the 16 Volksgrenadier Division in October 1944 and which was later involved in battles with American units in the Moselle Valley in France.
Sources
Goering's Grenadiers: The Luftwaffe Field Divisions, 1942-1945, MunozTiger in Combat - Normandy, W. Schneider
Grenadiers, Kurt Meyer
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